T H E J O U R N
Y FIRST published paper1 has come of age, and a t a time when the subjects it dealt with have come back into fashion. I t developed the equilibrium conditions for a rational consumer's lifetime consumption-saving pattern, a problem more recently given by Harrod the useful name of "hump saving" but which Landry, Bohm-Bawerk, Fisher, and others had touched on long before my time.2 I t dealt only with a single individual and did not discuss the mutual determination by all individuals of the *Research aid from the Ford Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
' "A Note on hleasurement of Utility," Rezliew oj Economic Studies, IV (1937) , 155-61.
As an undergraduate student of Paul Douglas at Chicago, I was struck by the fact that n e might, from the marginal utility schedule of consumptions, deduce saving behavior exactly in the same way that we might deduce gambling behavior. Realizing that, watching the consumer's gambling responses to varying odds, u e could deduce his numerical marginal utilities, it occurred to me that, by watching the consumer's saving responses to varying interest rates, we might similarly measure his marginal utilities, and thus the paper was born. (I knew and pointed out, p. 155, n. 2; p. 160 , that such a cardinal measurement of utility hinged on a certain refutable "independence" hypothesis.) market interest rates which each man had to accept parametrically as given to him. Now I should like to give a complete general equilibrium solution to the determination of the time-shape of interest rates. This sounds easy, but actually it is very hard, so hard that I shall have to make drastic simplifications in order to arrive a t exact results. For while Bohm and Fisher have given us the essential insights into the pure theory of interest, neither they nor other writers seem to have grappled with the following tough problem: in order to define an equilibrium path of interest in a perfect capital market endowed with perfect ccrtainty, you have to determine all interest rates between now and the end of time; every finite time period points beyond itself! Some interesting mathematical boundary problems, a little like those in the modern theories of dynamic programming, result from this analysis. *And the way is paved for a rigorous attack on a simple model involving money as a store of value and a medium of exchange. My essay concludes with some provocative remarks about the field of social collusions, a subject of vital importance for political economy and of great analytical interest to the modern theorist.
THE PROBLEM STATED
Let us assume that men enter the labor market a t about the age of twenty. They work for forty-five years or so and then live for fifteen years in retirement.
(As children they are part of their parents' consumptions, and we take no note of them.) Katurally, they want to consume in their old age, and, in the absence of comprehensive social securityan institution which has important bearing on interest rates and saving-men mill want to consume less than they produce during their working years so that they can consume something in the years when they produce nothing.
If there were only Robinson Crusoe, he would hope to put by some durable goods which could be drawn on in his old age. He would, so to speak, want to trade with Mother Nature current consumption goods in return for future consumption goods. And if goods kept perfectly, he could a t worst always make the trade through time on a one-to-one basis, and we could say that the interest rate was zero (i = 0). If goods kept imperfectly, like ice or radium, Crusoe might have to face a negative real interest rate, i < 0. If goods were like rabbits or yeast, reproducing without supervision a t compound interest, he would face a positive rate of interest, i > 0. This last case is usually considered to be technologically the most realistic one: that is, machines and round-about proccsses (rather than rabbits) are considered to have a "net productivity," and this is taken to be brute fact. (Rohm himself, after bitterly criticizing naive productivity theorists and criticizing Thiinen and others for assuming such a fact, ends up with his own celebrated third cause for interest, which also asserts the fact of net productivity. Contrary to much methodological discussion, there is nothing circular about assuming brute facts-that is all we can do; we certainly cannot deduce them, although, admittedly, we can hope by experience to refute falsely alleged facts.)
For the present purpose, I shall make the extreme assumption that nothing will keep a t all. Thus no intertemporal trade with Nature is possible (that is, for all such exchanges we would have i = -1!). If Crusoe were alone, he would obviously die a t the beginning of his retirement years.
But we live in a world where new generations are always coming along. Formerly we used to support our parents in their old age. That is now out of fashion. But cannot men during their productive years give up some of their product to bribe other men to support them in their retirement years? Thus, forty-year-old A gives some of his product to twentyyear-old B, so that when =\. gets to bc seventy-five he can receive some of the product that B is then producing.
Our problem, then, is this: I n a stationary population (or, alternatively, one growing in any prescribed fashion) what will be the intertemporal terms of trade or interest rates that will spring up spontaneously in ideally competitive markets? SIhIPLIFYING ASSUJIPTIONS To make progress, let us make convenient assumptions. Break each life up into thirds: men produce one unit of product in period 1and one unit in period 2 ; in period 3 they retire and produce nothing. (No one dies in midstream.) I n specifying consumption preferences, I suppose that each man's tastes can be summarized by an ordinal utility function of the consumptions of the three periods of his life: U = U(C1, Cz, C3). This is the same in every generation and has the usual regular indifference-curve concavities, but for much of the argument nothing is said about whether, subjectively, men systematically discount future consumptions or satisfactions.
(Thus Bohm's second cause of interest may or may not be operative; it could even be reversed, men being supposed to overvalue the future!) I n addition to ignoring Bohm's second cause of systematic time preference, I am in a sense also denying or reversing his first cause of interest, in that we are not supposing that society is getting more prosperous as time passes or that any single man can expect to be more prosperous a t a later date in his life, since, on the contrary, during his years of retirement he must look forward to producing even less than during his working years.
Finally, recall our assumption that no goods keep, no trade with Nature being possible, and hence Rohm7s third technological cause of interest is being denied.
Cnder these assumptions, what will be the equilibrium time path of interest rates?
INDIVIDUAL SAVING FUNCTIONS
The simplest case to tackle to answer this question is that of a stationary population, which has always been stationary in numbers and will always be stationary. This ideal case sidesteps the difficult "planning-until-infinity" aspect of the problem. I n it births are given by B t = B, the same constant for all positive and negative t.
Kow consider any time t. There are B men of age one, B men of age two, and B retired men of age three. Since each producer produces 1 unit, total product is B + B. Now, for convenience of symbols, let R t = 1/(1 + i t ) be the discount rate between goods (chocolates) of period t traded for chocolates of the next period, t + 1. Thus, if R t = 0.5, you must promise me two chocolates tomorrow to get me to part with one chocolate today, the interest rate being 100 per cent per period. If R t = 1, the interest rate is zero, and tomorrow's chocolates cost 1.0 of today's. If R t > 1, say R t = 1.5, the interest rate is negative, and one future chocolate costs 1.5 of today's. [Clearly, R t is the price of tomorrow's chocolates expressed in terms of today's chocolates as numeraire.)
IT-e seek the equilibrium levels of . . . This merely says that the total discounted value of his life's consumptions must equal the discounted value of his productions. Subject to this constraint, he will, for each given R t and Rt+l, determine an optimal (CI, C2, CQ) to maximize LT(C1, CS, C3), which we can summarize by the "demand" functions, In old age presumably Sg is negative, matched by positive youthful saving, so as to satisfy for all (Xi, Rt~1)the budget identity, Of course, these functions are subject to all the restrictions of modern consumption theory of the ordinal utility or revealed preference type. Thus, with consunption in every period being a "superior good," we can infer that dC3 d K t 4 1 > 0 and dS3 dRt+l < 0. (This says that lowering the interest rate earned on savings carried over into retirement nus st increase retirement consumption.) TT7e cannot unainbiguously deduce the sign of dS1 dRt and other terms, for the reasons implicit in modern consumption theory.
Ti-e can similarly work out the saving functions for men born a period later, which will be of the form S, (Rt+l,Rt+z) , etc., containing, of course, the later interest rates they will face-likewise for earlier interest rates facing men born earlier. Finally, our fundamental condition of clearing the market is this: Total net saving for the community must cancel out to zero in every period. (Remember that no goods keep and that real net investment is impossible, all loans being "consumption" loans.)
At any time t there exist Bt men of the first period, Bt-l men of the second period, and Bt-2 men of the third period. The sum of their savings gives us the fundamental equilibrium condition: for every t. Note that in Sz we have the interest rates of one earlier period than in S1,and in S3 we have still earlier interest rates (in fact, interest rates that are, a t time t, already history and no longer to be determined.) \Ye have such an equation for every t, and if we take any finite stretch of time and write out the equilibrium conditions, we always find them containing discount rates from before the finite period and discount rates from afterward. iJTe never seem to get enough equations: lengthening our time period turns out always to add as many new unknowns as it supplies equations, as will be spelled out later in equations (14).
THE STATIONARY CASE
iVe can try to cut the Gordian knot by our special assumption of stationariness, namely, = B, a given constant for all time ( 6 ) . . . RtPl = Rt = Rt+1= . . . = R, the unknown discount rate.
'I'he first of these is a demographic datum; the second assumption of nonchanging interest rates is a conjecture whose consistency we must explore and verify. Now substituting relations (6) in equation (3,we get one equilibrium equation to determine our one unknown R, namely, By inspection, we recognize a solution of equation (7) to be I< = 1, or i = 0: that is, zero interest must be one equilibrium rate under our condition^.^ lThy? Because by virtue of the budget identity (4). Can a common-sense explanation of this somewhat striking result be given? Let me try. I n a stationary system everyone goes through the same life-cycle, albeit a t different times. Giving over goods now to an older man is figuratively giving over goods to yourselj when old. At what rate does one give over goods to one's later self? At R > 1, or R < 1, or R = I? T o answer this, note that a chocolate today is a chocolate today, and when middle-aged A today gives over a chocolate to old B, there is a one-to-one physical transfer of chocolates, none melting in the transfer and none sticking to the hands of a broker. So, heuristically, we see that the hypothetical "transfer through time" of the chocolates must be a t R = 1 with the interest rate i exactly zero.
Note that this result is quite independent of whether or not people have a systematic subjective preference for present consumption over future. \Thy? Because we have assumed that if anyone has such a systematic preference, everyone has such a systematic preference. There is no one any different in the system, no outsider-so to speak-to exact 4 We shall see that R = 1 is not the only root of equation ( If productive opportunities were to exist, Mother Sature xould operate as an important outsider, ~vith whom trade could take place, and our conclusion would be modified. But recall our strong postulate that such technological opportunities are non-existent.
THEOREM: Every geometrically growing consumption-loan economy has an equilibrium market rate of interest exactly equal to its biological percentage growth rate.
Thus The equality of the market rate of interest in a pure consumption-loan world to the rate of population growth was deduced solely from mechanically finding a root of the supply-demand equations that clear the market. Experience often confirms what faith avers: that competitive market relations achieve some kind of an optimum.
Does the saving-consumption pattern given by Sl(R, R), S2(R, R), S3(R, R),
where R = 1/(1 + m), represent some kind of a social optimum? One would guess that, if it does maximize something, this ecpilibrium pattern probably maximizes the "lifetime (ordinal) well-being of a representative person, subject to the resources available to him (and to every other representative man) over his lifetime." Or, what seems virtually the same thing, consider a cross-sectional family or clan that has an unchanging age distribution because the group remains in statistical equilibrium, though individuals are born and die. Such a clan will divide its available resources to maximize a welfare function differing only in scale from each man's utility function and will achieve the same result as the biological growth rate. To test this optimality conjecture, first stick to the stationary population case. The representative man is thought to maximize L7(C1, C2, C3), subject to 1 + 1 being the lifetime product available to each man. The solution to this technocratic welfare problem (free in its formulation and solution of all mention of prices or interest rates) requires But this formulation is seen to be identical with that of a single maximizing man facing market discount rates R1 = R2 = 1. Hence the solution of equations (10) and (11) is exactly that given earlier by equation (3): that is, our present welfare problem has, for its optimality solution, Now that we have verified our conjecture for the stationary m = 0 case, we can prove it for population growing like > B(l + m)', where m z 0. As before, we maximize U(C1, C2, C3) for the representative man. But what resources are now available to him? Recall that in a growing population the age distribution is permanently skewed in favor of the younger productive ages: society and each clan has an age distribution pro-
and has therefore a per capita output to divide in consumption among the three age classes satisfying By following a representative man throughout his life and remembering that there are always (1 + ?n)-' just older than he and (1 + m)-2 two periods older, we derive this same "budget" or availibility equation. Subject to equation (12), we maximize li(C1, C2, C3) and necessarily end up with the same conditions as would a competitor facing the biological market interest rate R1 = Rz = 1/(1 + m): namely, Hence the identity of the social optimality conditions and the biological market interest theory has been demon~t r a t e d .~
CODIDION-SENSE EXPLANATION O F BIOLOGICAL MARKET INTEREST

RATE
Productivity theorists have always related interest to the biological habits of rabbits and cows. And Gustav Cassel long ago developed a striking (but rather nonsensical) biological theory relating If C has the usual quasi-concavity, this social optimum ~vill be unique-whether U does or does not have the time-symmetry that is sometimes (for concreteness) assumed in later arguments. A-ot only will the representative man's utility U be maximized, but so will the "total" of social utility enjoyed over a long period of time: specifically, the divergence from attainable bliss over all time will be miminized, where U * is the utility achieved nhen RI = 1 = R?and Si = Si(1, interest to the life-expectancy of men of means and their alleged propensity to go from maintaining capital to the buying of annuities at an allegedly critical positive i. I seem to be the Grst, outside a slave economy, to develop a biological theory of interest relating it to the reproductivity of human mothers.
Is there a common-sense market explanation of this (to me a t least) astonishing result? I suppose it would go like this: in a growing population men of twenty outnumber men of forty; and retired men are outnumbered by workers more than in the ratio of the work span to the retirement span. 113th more workers to support them, the aged live better than in the stationary state-the excess being positive interest on their savings.
Such an explanation cannot be deemed entirely convincing. Outside of social security and family altruism, the aged have no claims on the young: cold and selfish coillpetitive markets will not teleologically respect the old; the aged will get only what supply and demand impute to them.
So we might try another more detailed explanation. Recall that Inen of forty or of period 2 bargain with Inen of twenty or period 1, trying to bribe the latter to them with consumption in their retirement. (Men of over sixty-five or of period 3 can make fresh bargains with no one: after retirement it is too late for them to try to provide for their old age.) In a growing population there are more period 1men for period 2 men to bargain with; this presumably confers a competitive advantage on period 2 men, the manifestation of it being the positive interest rate.
So might go the explanation. I t is a t least superficialljr plausible, and it does qualitatively suggest a positive interest rate when population is growing, al-though perhaps it falls short of explaining the remarkable quantitative identity between the growth rates of interest and of population.
THE INFINITY P.4R4DOX REVEALED
But will the explanation survive rigorous scrutiny? Is it true, in a growing or in a stationary population, that twentyyear-olds are, in fact, overconsuming so that the middle-aged can provide for their retirement? Specifically, in the stationary case where R = 1, is it necessarily true that S1(l, 1) < O? Study of U(C1, Cz, CB) shows how doubtful such a general result would be; thus, if there is no systematic subjective time preference so that l; is a function symmetric in its arguments, it would be easy to show that C1 = Cz = C3 = 3, with S1(l, 1) = Sz(l, 1) = +Q and S3(1, 1) = -3. Contrary to our scenario, the middle-aged are not turning over to the young what the young will later make good to them in retirement support.
THE TXVO-PERIOD CASE The paradox is delineated more clearly if we suppose but two equal periods of life-work and retirement. Now it becomes impossible for a n y worker to find a worker younger than himself to be bribed to support him in old age. IThatever the trend of births, there is but one equilibrium saving pattern possible: during working years, consumption equals product and saving is zero; the same during the brutish years of retirement. \17hat equilibrium interest rate, or R, will prevail? Since no transactions take place, R = 010, so to speak, and appears rather indeterminate-and rather academic. However, if men desperately want some consumption a t all times, only R = m can be regarded as the (virtual) equilibrium rate, with interest equal to -100 per cent per p e r i~d .~ \\'e think we know the right answer just given in the two-period case. Let us test our previous mathematical methods. Now our equations are much as before and can be summarized by:
Maximize U(C1, Cz) = U ( 1 -S1, 0 -Sz) subject to S1+ RtSz= 0 .
The resulting saving functions, S1(Rt) and S2(Rt), are subject to the budget identity, So the two-period matherllatics appears to give us the same answer as before--a biological rate of interest equal to the rate of population growth.
Yet we earlier deduced that there can be n o ~~o l u n t a r y saving in a kto-period u~orld. Instead of S1> 0, we must have S1 = O = S z with R = +m . How can we reconcile this with the mathematics?
r\ later numerical example, where U = log C1 + log Cq + log Ca, shows that cases car] arise where n3 positive R, however large, will clear the market. I adopt the harmless convention of setting R = rn in every case, even if the limit as R -+ m does not wipe out the discrepancy between supply and demand. \Ye substitute S1 = 0 = Sz in equation (5') or equation (8'), and indeed this does satisfy the clearing-of-themarket equation. -4pparently our one equilibrium equation in our one unknown R has more than a single solution ! And the relevant one for a free market is not that given by our biological or demographic theorj-of interest, even though our earlier social optimality argument does perfectly iit the twoperiod case.
TIIE PARADOX CONTEhIPLATED
The transparent two-period case alerts us to the possibility that in the threeperiod (or n-period) case, the fundamental equation of supply and demand Inay have multiple solutions. .And, indeed, it does.8 \Ye see that is indeed a valid mathematical solution. This raises the following questions :
Is a condition of no saving with dismal retirement consumption and interest rate of -100 per cent per period thinkable as the economically correct equilibrium for a free market?
Surely, the non-myopic middle-aged will do almost anything to make retirement consumption, C3 non-zero?g One might conjecture that the fact that, in the three-period model, ~vorkers can always find younger workers to bargain with is a crucial difference from the two-period case.1° To investigate the There is nothing surprising ahout multiple solutions in economics: not infrequently income effects make possil~le other intersections, including the possibility of an infinite numt~er where demand and supply curves coincide.
Before answering these questions, it would be well to decide what the word "surely" in the previous sentence means. Surely, no sentence heginning bcith the word "surely" can validly contain a question mark a t its end2 However, one paradox is enough for one article, and I shall stick to my economist's last. problem, we must drop the assumption of a population that is, always has been, and always will be stationarj-(or exponentially growing or exponentially decaying). For within that ambiguous context R = 1(R < 1, R > 1) was indeecl an impeccable solution, in the sense that no one can point to a violated equilibrium condition. (Exactly the same can be said of the two-period case, even though we "know" the impeccable solution is economically nonsense.)
IYe must give mankind a beginning. So, once upon a time, B rnen were born into the labor force. Then B more. Then B more. Until what? Lntil . . . ? Or until no more men are born? Must we give mankind an end as well as a beginning? Even the Lord rested after the beginning. so let us tackle one problem a t a time and keep births forever constant. Our equilibrium equations, with the constant H's omitted, now become \Ye feel that S1-0 -Sz-S3, while a mathematical solution, is not the economically relevant one. Since SI(1, I), S2(1, I), and S3(1, I) do satisfy the last By introducing overlap hetween workers of different ages, the three-period model is essentially equivalent to a general n-period model or to the continuous-time model of real life.
of the written equations, we dare hope" that the Invisible Hand will ultimately work its way to the socially optimal biological-interest configuration-or that the solution to equation ( 
TIIE 13IPOSSIBILITY TIiEOREhI
But have we any right to hope that the free market will even ultimately approach the specified social optimum? Does not the two-period case rob us of hope? \\?11 not all the trade that the three-period case makes possible consist of middle-aged period 2 people giving consumption to young period 1 people in return for getting consumption back from them one period later? n o not such voluntary mutual-aid compacts suggest that, if K t does approach a limit x, it must be such as to make Sl(x, x) < O? \'\'hereas, for many men12 not too subject to systematic preference for the present over the future (not too affected by Bohm's second cause of interest), we expect S1(l, 1) > 0.
A colleague, whose conjectures are " Our confidence in this viould be enhanced if the linear diiference equation relating small deviations r t = R t -1 had characteristic roots all less than 1 in al~solute value. Thus a0r1+3+ airt+z + alrill+ n j r t = 0, where the a, are given in terms of the S ' ( R t . Rt+l) functions and their partial derivatives, e\alusted a t Rt = 1 Kt+]. Logically, this w011ld be neither quite necessary nor sufficient: not sufficient, sincc the initial Ro, XI, I<,might be so far from 1 as to make the linear approximations irrelevant; not necesszry, since, with one root less than unity in a1)solute \slue, we might ride in toward R = 1 on a razor's edge. I n any case, a s our later numerical example shows, our hope is a vain one. l2 There is admittedly some econometric evidence that many young adults do dissave, to acquire assets and for other reasons. Some modifications of exposition would have to be made to allow for this. often better than many people's theorems, has suggested to me that in the three-period or n-period case I am taking too bilateral a view of trade. We might end up with S 1 > 0 and encounter no contradictions to voluntary trade by virtue of the fact that young men trade with anyone in the market: they do not know or care that all or part of the motive for trade with them comes from the desire of the middle-aged to provide for retirement. The present young are content to be trading with the present old (or, for that matter, with the unborn or dead): all they care about is that their trades take place a t the quoted market prices; and, if some kind of triangular or multilateral offsetting among the generations can take place and result in S1(Rt, Rt+l)positive and becoming closer and closer to Sl(1, 1) > 0, why cannot this happen?
I, too, found the multilateral notion appealing. But the following considerations-of a type I do not recall seeing treated anbwhere-suggest to me that the ultimate approach to R = 1 and SI(1, 1) > 0 is quite impossible.
List all men from the beginning to time t. All the voluntary trades ever made must be mutually advantageous.
If A gives something to B and B does nothing for A directly in return, we know B must be doing something for some C, who does do something good for A. (Of course, C might be more than one man, and there might be many-linked connections within C.)
Now consider a time when S1(Rt, Rt+l) has become positive, with S2(Rt-l, Rt) also positive. Young man A is then giving goods to old man B. Young man A expects something in return and will actually two periods later be getting goods from someone. From whom? I t certainly cannot be directly from B: B will I be dead then. Let it be from someoce called C. Can B ever do anything good for such a C, or have in the past done so? KO.B only has produce during his first two periods of life, and all the good he can do anyone must be to people who were born before him or just after him. That ftezler includes C. So the postulated pattern of S1> 0 is logically impossible in a free market: and hence 2it = 1 = &,-I, as an exact or approximate relation, is impossible. (Kote that, for some special pattern of time preference, the competitive solution ?night coincide with the "biological optimum. ")
X iSU1IEKICAL EXAMPLE
,1concrete case will illustrate all this.
'I'he purest RIarshallian case of unitary price and income elasticities can be characterized by 2: = log C1 + log Cz + log CS, where all systematic time preference is replaced by symvzetry.
.'i~nasilnurn of log C, subject to (16) C1+R1C2 +R1R2C7a = 1 +R1 implies and, after combining this with the budget equation, we end up with saving functions,
Equations (14) now take the form Alside from initial conditions, this can he written in the recursive form, S o t e that dS1(RI, Rz) = 0 made our third-order difference equation degenerate into a second-order difference equation.
If we expand the last equation around Rt-2 = 1 = Rt-l, retaining only linear terms and working in terms of deviations from the equilibrium level, r t = R, -1, we get the recursive system, which obviously explodes away from r = 0 and R = 1 for all small perturbations from such an equilibrium. This con- IYe know that x = 1, the irrelevant optimal level, is one root; so, dividing it out, we end up with
Solving the quadratic, we have for the asymptote approached by the free competitive market. The other root, (3 -d G ) / 2 , corresponds to a negative R, which is economically meaningless, in that it implies that the more we give up of today's consumption, the more we must give up of tomorrow's. Our meaningful positive root, R = 3.297, corresponds to an ultimate negative interest rate,
l 3 Martin J. Bailey has pointed out to me that the budget equation and the clearing-of-the-market equations do, in the stationary state, imply SI = RS3 whenever R g 1, a fact which can be used to give an alternative demonstration of possible equilibrium values. which implies that consumptioil loans lose about two-thirds of their principal in one period. This is here the competitive price to avoid retirement starvation.14 RECAPITULATION The task of giving an exact description of a pure consumption-loan interest model is finished. IVe end up, in the stationaiy population case, with a negative market interest rate, rather than with the biological zero interest rate corresponding to the social optimum for the representative man. This was proved by the impossibility theorem and verified by an arithmetic example.
A corresponding result will hold for changing population where m $ 0. The actual competitive market rate i, will always be negative and always less than the biological optimality rate m.'" And l4 In other examples, this competitive solution would not deviate so much from the i = m hiological optimum. But it is important to realize that solutions to equations (14) that come from quasiconcave utility functions-with or without systematic time preference-cannot he counted on to approach as!mptotically the biological optimum configuration of equation (13).
In this case the linear approximation gives for ur = R1 -3.297 the recursion relation
A
This difference equation has roots easily shown to be less than 1 in absolute value, so the local stability of our competitive equilibrium is assured. increasing the productive years relative to the retirement years of zero product would undoubtedly still leave us with a negative interest rate, albeit one that climbs ever closer to zero. Is this negative interest rate a hardto-believe result? Not, I think, when one recalls our extreme and purposely unrealistic assumptions. 12'ith Bohm's third technological reason for interest ruled out by assumption, with his second reason involving systematic preference for the present soft-pedaled, and with his first reason reversed (that is, with people expecting to be poorer in the future), we should perhaps have been surprised if the market rate had not turned out negative.
Yet, aside from giving the general biological optimum interest rate, our model is an instructive one for a number of reasons.
1. I t shows us what interest rates would be implied if the "hump saving" process were acting alone in a world devoid of systematic time preference.16 2. I t incidentally confirms what modern theorists showed long ago but what is still occasionally denied in the literature, that a zero or negative interest rate is in no sense a logically contradictory thing, however bizarre may be the em- pirical hypotheses that entail a zero or negative rate.
3. I t may help us a little to isolate the effects of adding one by one, or together, (a) technological investment possibilities, (b) innovations that secularly raise productivity and real incomes, (c) strong biases toward present goods and against future goods, (d) governmental laws and more general collusions than are envisaged in simple laissez faire markets, or (e) various aspects of uncertainty. To be sure, other orderings of analysis would also be possible; and these separate processes interact, with the whole not the simple sum of its parts.
-2. I t points up a fundamental and intrinsic deficiency in a free pricing system, namely, that free pricing gets you on the Pareto-efficiency frontier but by itself has no tendency to get you to positions on the frontier that are ethically optimal in terms of a social welfare function; only by social collusions-of tax, expenditure, fiat, or other type-can an ethical observer hope to end up where he wants to be. (This obvious and ancient point is related to 3d above.)
5. The present model enables us to see one "function" of money from a new slant-as a social compact that can provide optimal old age social security. (This is also related to 3d above.)
For the rest of this essay, I shall develop aspects of the last two of these themes.
SOCIAL COMPACTS AND THE OPTIMUM
If each man insists on a quid pro quo, we apparently continue until the end of time, with each worse of: than in the social optimum, biological interest case. Yet how easy it is by a simple change in the rules of the game to get to the optimum. Let mankind enter into a HobbesRousseau social contract in which the young are assured of their retirement subsistence if they will today support the aged, such support to be guaranteed by a draft on the yet-unborn. Then the social optimum can be achieved within one lifetime, and our equations (14) will become from t = 3 on.
IVe economists have been told17 that what we are to economize on is love or altruism, this being a scarce good in our imperfect world. True enough, in the sense that we want what there is to go as far as possible. But it is also the task of political economy to point out where common rules in the form of self-imposed fiats can attain higher positions on the social welfare functions prescribed for us by ethical observers.
The Golden Rule or Kant's Categorical Imperative (enjoining like people to follow the common pattern that makes each best off) are often not self-enforcing: if all but one obey, the one may gain selfish advantage by disobeying-which is where the sheriff comes in: we politically invoke force on ourselves, attempting to make an unstable equilibrium a stable one.Is Once social coercion or contracting is admitted into the picture, the present problem disappears. The economics of social collusions is a rich field for analysis, involving fascinating predictive and normative properties. Thus, when society acts as if it were maximizing certain functions, we can predict the effect upon equilibrium of specified exogenous disburbances. And certain patterns of thought appropriate to a single mind become appropriate, l8 NOW, admittedly, there is usually lacking in the real world the axes of symmetry needed to make all this an easy process. In a formulation elsewhere, I have shoxn some of the requirements for an optimal theory of public expenditure of the SaxWicksell-Lindahl-Musgrave-Bowen type, and the failure of the usual voting and signaling mechanisms to converge to an optimum solution (see &'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditare," Reviea of Econonzics end Statistics, XXXVI [Sovember, 19541, 387-89 , and "Diagrammatic Exposition of Public Expenditure," ibid., XXXVII [Sovemher, 19551, 350-56) . Such a model is poles apart from the pure case in which Walrasian laissez faire happens to be optimal. I should be prepared to argue that a good deal of s hat is important and interesting in the real world lies betrieen these extreme poles, perhaps in hetween in the sense of displaying properties that are a blending of the polar properties. But such discussion must await another time.
l9 How can the competitive coniiguration with negative interest rates be altered to everyone's advantage? Does not this deny the Pareto optimality of perfect competition, which is the least (and most) Tve can expect from it? Here we encounter one msre paradox, which no d~b t arises from the "infinity" aspect of our model. If we assume a large finite span to the human race-say 1 million generationsthen the iinal few generations face the equations where T = 1,000,000.
If x e depart from the negative interest rate pattern, the final young will be cheated by the demise of the human race. Should sach a cheating of one generation 30 million years from now perpetually condemn society to a suboptimal coniiguration? Perfect competition shrugs its shoulders a t such a question and (not improperly) sticks to its Pareto optimality. even though we reject the notion of a group mind. (Example : developed social security could give rise to the same bias toward increasing population that exists among farmers and close family groups, where children are wanted as a means of old age support.)
The economics of collusion provides an important field of study for the theorist. Such collusions can be important elements of strength in the struggle for existence. Reverence for life, in the Schweitzer sense of respecting ants and flowers, might be a handicap in the Darwinian struggle for existence. (And, since the reverencer tends to disappear, the ants may not be helped much in the long run.) But culture in which altruism abounds-because men do not think to behave like atomistic competitors or because men have by custom and law entered into binding social contractsmay have great survival and expansion powers.
An essay could be written on the welfare state as a complicated device for self-or reinsurance. (From this view, the graduated income tax becomes in part a device for reducing ex ante variance.) That the Protestant Ethic should have been instrumental in creating individual--istic capitalism one may accept; but that it should stop there is not necessarily plausible.20 I17hat made Jeremy Bentham a Benthamite in 1800, one suspects, might in 1900 have made him a Fabian (and do we not see a lot in common in the personalities of James Mill and Friedrich Engels?).
Much as you and I may dislike government "interferences" in economic life, we must face the positive fact that the moti20Recall the Myrdal thesis that the austere planned economies of Europe are Protestant, the Catholic countries being individualistic.
vations for higher living standards that a free market channels into \iTalrasian equilibrium when the special conditions for that pattern happen to be favorable -these same motivations often lead to social collusions and myriad uses of the apparatus of the state. For good or evil, these may not be aberrations from laisser. faire, but theorems entailed by its intrinsic axioms.
CONCLUSION: MONEY AS A SOCIAL
CONTRIVANCE
Let me conclude by applying all these considerations to an analysis of the role of money in our consumption-loan world. I n it nothing kept. All ice melted, and so did all chocolates. (If non-depletable land existed, it must have been superabundant.) iyorkers could not carry goods over into their retirement years.
There is no arguing with Nature. But what is to stop man-or rather menfrom printing oblongs of paper or stamping circles of shell. These units of money can keep.21 (Even if ink fades, this could be true.) With ideal clearing arrangements, money as a medium of exchange might have little function. But remember that a money medium of exchange is itself a rather efficient clearing arrangement.
So suppose men officially through the state, or unofficially through custom, make a grand consensus on the use of these greenbacks as a money of exchange. Now the young and middle-aged do have something to hold and to carry over into their retirement years. And note this: as long as the new current generations of 2' I have been asked whether introducing durable money does not violate my fiat against durable goods and trades with Nature. All that I must insist on is that the new durable moneys (or records) be themselves quite worthless for consumption. The essence of them as money is that they are valued only for what they will fetch in exchange.
workers do not repudiate the old money, this gives workers of one epoch a claim on workers of a later epoch, even though no real quid pro quo (other than money) is possible.
tVe then find this remarkable fact: without legislating social security or entering into elaborate social compacts, society by using money will go from the non-optimal negative-interest-rate configuration to the optimal biological-interest-rate configuration. How does this happen? I shall try to give only a sketchy account that does not pretend to be rigorous.
Take the stationary population case with m = 0. IVith total money M constant and the flow of goods constant, the price level can be espected very soon to level off and be constant. The productive invest their hump savings in currency; in their old age they disinvest this currency, turning it over to the productive workers in return for sustenance.
With population growing like (1 + m)t, output will come to grow a t that rate. Fixed M will come to mean prices falling like 1/(1 + m)t . Each dollar saved today will thus yield a real rate of interest of exactly m per period-just what the biological social-optimality configuration calls for. Similarly, when m < 0 and population falls, rising prices will create the desired negative real rate of interest equal to m.
I n short, the use of money can itself be regarded as a social compact.22 IThen economists say that one of the functions of money is to act as a store of wealth and that one of money's desirable properties is constancy of value (as measured by constancy of average prices), we are entitled to ask: How do you know this? IYhy should prices be stable? On what tablets is that injunction written? Perhaps the function of money, if it is to serve as an optimal store of wealth, is so to change in its value as to create that optimal pattern of lifetime saving which could otherwise be established only by alternative social contrivance^.^^ I do not pretend to pass judgment on the policies related to all this. But I do suggest for economists' further research the difficult analysis of capital models which grapple with the fact that each and every today is followed by a tomorrow.
In terms of immediate self-interest the existing productive workers should perhaps unilaterally repudiate the money upon which the aged hope to live in retirement. (Compare the Russian and Belgium calling-in of currencies.) So a continuing social compact is required. (Compare, too, current inflationary trends which do give the old less purchasing power than many of them had counted on.)
23 Conversely, with satisfactory social security programs, the necessity for having secular stable prices so that the retired are taken care of can be lightened. Even after extreme inflations, social security programs can re-create themselves anew astride the community's indestructible real tax base.
